

AD-A209 050



CLIC PAPERS

**RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT
TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT STRATEGY:
FUTURE ISSUES**

**Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia**

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89 6 12 062

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

Form approved
OMB No 2704-0188
Exp Date Jun 30 1986

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS NA	
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY NA		3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT The paper has been cleared for public release by security and policy review authorities.	
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE NA		5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
3 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict	6b OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) A-AF CLIC	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Langley AFB, VA 23665-5556		7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO
		TASK NO	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

Reserve Component Support to United States National Low Intensity Conflict Strategy: Future Issues (Unclassified)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Kenneth G. Brothers, Lt Col, USAF

13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO NA	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1989 April	15 PAGE COUNT 47
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16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17 COSATI CODES			18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
			Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Reserve Component

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The low intensity conflict (LIC) environment continues to present significant challenges to United States policies and strategic objectives in the Third World. As LIC is defined as being below conventional war, indirect application of military force through security assistance has become a key element of United States LIC strategy. In conditions short of war, the reserve components have substantial capabilities to fulfill United States strategic LIC objectives. Many of the specialized personnel, skills, and equipment applicable to noncombat roles lie primarily in the reserve components. For some of these skills, 100% of the US military and naval capabilities are in the reserve components. Approximately two-thirds of the medical and construction engineering skills that can be used to assist Third World friends and allies in nation building activities reside in the reserve components.

(continued on back)

20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS	21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Ronald L. Zelms, Maj, USAF	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (804) 764-2630
22c. OFFICE SYMBOL A-AF CLIC	

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NATIONAL LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT STRATEGY:
FUTURE ISSUES**

by

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By _____	
Distribution/ _____	
Availability Codes	
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	Special

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**Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665-5556**

April 1989

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The mission of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) is to improve the Army and Air Force posture for engaging in low intensity conflict (LIC), elevate awareness throughout the Army and Air Force of the role of the military instrument of national power in low intensity conflict, including the capabilities needed to realize that role, and provide an infrastructure for eventual transition to a joint and, perhaps, interagency activity.

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DTIC AD#	DLSIE LD#	SHORT TITLE
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A185 975	073896A	The Role of Reserve Forces in LIC
A185 976	073895A	Compilation of LIC References and Bibliography, Vol I
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		Arms Transfers and the Third World
		LIC Policy and Strategy Statements

PREFACE

The low intensity conflict (LIC) environment continues to present significant challenges to United States policies and strategic objectives in the Third World. As LIC is defined as being below conventional war, indirect application of military force through security assistance has become a key element of United States LIC strategy. In conditions short of war, the reserve components have substantial capabilities to fulfill United States strategic LIC objectives. Many of the specialized personnel, skills, and equipment applicable to noncombat roles lie primarily in the reserve components. For some of these skills, 100% of US military and naval capabilities are in the reserve components. Approximately two-thirds of the medical and construction engineering skills that can be used to assist Third World friends and allies in nation building activities reside in the reserve components.

The purpose of this paper is to lay a foundation for addressing future issues by first reviewing some of the current roles, missions, and legal limitations reserve component units and personnel face while operating in the LIC environment. The future issues raised are applicable to both the active and reserve components. When addressed, these issues should determine if, and to what extent, the reserve components will be used to satisfy United States strategic LIC objectives.

The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the guidance of my former boss, Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Turner, USA (retired), who introduced me to the world of the reserve components. His experience and insights helped to open my vision to both the problems and the potential gains that accrue when the reserve components are used to meet the LIC challenge.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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**RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT TO
UNITED STATES NATIONAL LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT STRATEGY:
FUTURE ISSUES**

INTRODUCTION

As the United States approaches the 21st Century, defense planners must continue to provide the National Command Authorities sufficient flexibility to respond to a variety of contingencies, ranging from peacetime missions to low intensity conflict to general war. To achieve a credible deterrent force across the full conflict spectrum, they must strike an appropriate balance between active and reserve component forces; overseas- and United States-based forces; combat, combat support, and combat service support forces; and types of forces (air, ground, sea, heavy, light, special operations, etc.).

Today, the balance between active and reserve component forces is a result of the Total Force policy. This policy seeks to better integrate active and reserve component personnel and units into contingency war plans, while taking advantage of the cost savings inherent in part-time reserve component forces versus full-time active component forces. Consequently, the Total Force policy permits a more cost efficient and highly credible force to deter interests hostile to those of the United States. Should US deterrent strategy fail, the reserve components provide the crucial expansion and sustainment of the active duty force to reestablish peace through victory on the battlefield. While traditionally thought of as being in reserve, today's mission requirements for reserve component units are much different than in past decades. For various contingencies or conflicts, reserve component units may be deployed simultaneously with, or even ahead of, active component forces.¹ With budget constraints causing projections of a smaller active force, the reserve components will assume an even greater role in the Total Force. As a result, additional National Guard and Reserve units continue to be established. In the realm of low intensity conflict (LIC), the reserve components have significant capabilities to fulfill US national LIC strategic objectives, especially in conditions short of armed combat. Many of the specialized personnel, skills, and equipment applicable to noncombat roles lie primarily in the reserve components. For some of these skills, 100% of US military and naval capabilities are in the reserve components. Approximately two-thirds of the medical and construction engineering skills that could be used to assist Third World friends and allies in nation building tasks reside in the reserve components. Achieving and maintaining readiness to deter war from the low to the high end of the conflict spectrum is a key contribution of the reserve components to US national security.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the current roles and missions reserve component personnel and units fulfill in LIC environments, some of the legal limitations on reserve component use in LIC, and, finally, several future reserve component and Total Force LIC issues. While the reserve components span all five services, the author's reserve component exposure has been primarily with US Army reserve component activities in the US Southern Command area. Consequently, this paper and its recommendations come from a predominantly Army-oriented background. For those not familiar with the reserve component system, Part I gives a brief overview of the reserve component training environment and some of its limitations. Part II is a discussion of the legal basis and constraints for reserve component deployments outside the continental United States. Part III describes the LIC environment prevalent in the Third World, what threat the LIC environment poses to US interests, and what the current US national LIC strategy is. Part IV examines portions of the US strategy involving the indirect, noncombat application of US military power, viewed with the reserve components in mind. Part V discusses future LIC issues that should be addressed if the reserve components are to have a vital part in fulfilling US national LIC strategy.

PART I

RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING READINESS

The reserve components were formed "to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires . . ."² Historically, the primary consideration for placing a unit in the reserve component was the suitability of the unit mission to the reserve component system, and, perhaps critically, the required mission response time. The most suitable missions for the reserve components were envisioned as those with low peacetime activity levels and high wartime surge requirements.³ Accordingly, training time was kept at levels designed not to unduly interfere with the reserve component member's civilian job. Mandated by law, training time was set at either 38 days for those in the Reserves or 39 days for those in the National Guard. This training time is normally broken up into one weekend each month (24 days), plus 14 or 15 consecutive days of "annual training."⁴ When you consider the amount of time available to train the individual soldier, remember one year equals, at most, 39 days. Look at it this way. It's January 1 when your unit, which normally supports a European scenario, receives its first notice of a unit deployment exercise to Bolivia. Your unit must be ready to ship out on 8 February. For those active component units that routinely plan for worldwide deployments anywhere at anytime, it's a piece of cake. Thirty-nine calendar days is plenty of notice. However, for a reserve component unit, 39 days

equals one calendar year. In the above scenario, the reserve component unit would normally have only four training days available to prepare for deployment. It is nearly impossible to compress 39 days of planning and preparation activity into just 4 days!

Of course, personnel in key or highly technical positions, aircrews, etc.. receive additional training time. This permits the maintenance of a high degree of readiness that the Total Force policy demands.⁵ For example, Air National Guard aircrews average about 84 days per year of active duty vice the minimum of 39.⁶ Given sufficient warning of an overseas deployment exercise such as the one described above, there are still other factors impacting reserve component unit preparation. The following information is extracted from an Army Training Board report on the reserve components:⁷

DISPERSION. The approximate 7000 reserve component units in the force are based at over 4600 separate locations. At unit (battalion/separate company and detachment) level, the average distance to its next higher headquarters is 105.6 miles, and it takes almost 3 hours to get there. At battalion level the average unit is dispersed over a 150-mile radius and some extend to over 300. Their active component counterparts are typically clustered within a mile or less of each other. At the higher levels of command, few headquarters have all of their subordinate units in the same state; many extend over several, and some cover as many as 12 states. Comparable active component units live on a single installation or on several within a few hours drive. This dispersion of reserve component units is dictated largely by recruiting capabilities related to population densities and the ability of soldiers to get to their units for training from reasonable distances. Even so, many travel several hundred miles one way to train and some travel up to 500.

Distance between units is only one effect of dispersion. The distances from a given unit to almost every other common training support location is also lengthened. On the average, reserve component units travel 9.2 miles to get to a motor pool, primarily to access wheeled vehicles. To get to their major equipment at Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites/Equipment Concentration Sites, they travel 128.5 miles. In order to reach a collective training site, they travel 40.1 miles to the nearest Local Training Area or 154.2 miles to the nearest Major Training Area. To go to a rifle range, reserve component units travel 65.7 miles (only 20 percent have usable local small caliber ranges), and, if a reserve component unit wishes

to draw devices for training, it travels 149.2 miles to get them. These are all average one-way distances and whenever they come into play, training time is used to make the trips.

TURNOVER RATES. Personnel turbulence or turnover is another factor. Annual turnover rate, at E5 and below, is up to 50 percent per annum. Relative to training time available, in conservative terms, this equates to active component annual turnover rates of between 187 percent and 243 percent per year. (Author's Note: The Army report did not specify how this ratio was derived. Most likely it is based on 39 reserve component workdays per year versus an average of 252 days available for active component personnel, which discounts annual leave and weekend duty.)

SKILL QUALIFICATION. Unlike an active unit, many soldiers joining a reserve component unit are not qualified in their duty skills. More than 40 percent of them (non-prior service) have no military training upon assignment and a substantial portion of the remainder (prior service) do not have skills or training in the positions to which they are assigned. The result is that approximately 70 percent of all enlisted soldiers who join a given unit each year require training to qualify for the job to which they are assigned.

STRUCTURAL CHANGE. In FY 1986, 122 reserve component units were activated, 18 were deactivated, and 233 underwent major conversions (about one unit of every 20 in the force). In the period 1988-1992, almost 2500 reserve component units will undergo one or more structural changes and in 1989 alone over 2000 Army National Guard units will receive some new or displaced equipment. Most of these changes are accompanied by a major management workload. Structural changes sometimes include the physical relocation of soldiers, but more often leave groups of soldiers where they are and convert them in place. This in-place conversion creates large scale skill changes which becomes an added training management challenge for the unit.

To guide their very limited training time, Army commanders use the mission essential task list (METL) as their primary tool to identify, prioritize, and plan training. The METL identifies mission essential tasks at each level (e.g., battalion, company, platoon, squad, and section) based on the unit's wartime mission in concert with their CAPSTONE gaining commands.⁸ CAPSTONE is an Army program originated in the 1970s to link active component units, warfighting contingency plans, and the reserve component units that augment those plans through mobilization. This

enabled the units to focus their very limited training time on geographically specific missions. For example, a medical unit CAPSTONE-aligned to Europe may define the METL for its nurses as consisting of 142 different tasks. Out of basic training, the individual may have learned 39 of those tasks. The 39 days-a-year training program must teach the other 103 tasks, of which 55 may be crucial to support a European scenario.⁹ Now add a LIC mission to . . . Ecuador! Suddenly the training load is thrown totally out of alignment. Hypothetically, of the 55 priority training tasks for Europe, only 20 may be applicable in Ecuador. In a mad scramble to discover what is needed (no small task in itself), the unit training officer may discover 35 "new" skill requirements, many of which the unit may never use again after the Ecuador exercise. As one Army special forces brigadier general stated, "With our mission lying across the full spectrum of conflict, we don't have enough time to teach our soldiers the mid to high intensity warfare skills, let alone those needed in LIC."¹⁰

Discussions with numerous reserve component commanders, unit personnel, and staff agencies all point to overseas deployment training as one of the best training tools for enhancing wartime readiness of the reserve components. Army reserve component training outside the continental United States is regulated by Army Regulation 350-9, Overseas Deployment Training. Its objectives are to strengthen CAPSTONE relationships and provide stateside-based units the opportunity to conduct Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-tasked wartime mission planning and training overseas.¹¹ Overseas deployment training also provides reserve component units the opportunity to sharpen the full gamut of their mobilization skills. The level of participation in this important training program has increased dramatically since its inception. As an example, Army Reserve activity rose from 12 cells in 1976 to over 2,562 cells (16,500 people) in fiscal year 1986.¹² In fact, for all reserve components, participation in 1986 totaled over 94,000 personnel in over 84 different countries.¹³

PART II

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Considerable amounts of legislation have been written concerning conditions for using the reserve components overseas. To complicate matters, the National Guard is both a state and federal asset, which has resulted in legal challenges by several state governors over, "Who controls the National Guard, and, under what conditions?" Much of the legislation is also written in terms of wartime reserve component missions, with most of the day-to-day peacetime missions overseas being viewed as an active component responsibility. Consequently, peacetime activities of the reserve components overseas are constrained. As LIC is that

gray area below conventional war and above routine, peaceful competition among states or groups (interpreted by many as higher risk operations), the use of the reserve components overseas is invariably a sensitive matter. In order to understand the constraints applicable outside the continental United States, the following information has been extracted from a lengthy Department of the Army Memorandum from the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Subject: Issues Attending Reserve Component Personnel Deployments Outside the Continental United States:¹⁴

1. Ordering Reserve Component Personnel and Units to Active Duty.

a. Sections 672-674 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), provide most of the statutory authority for ordering or calling reserve component personnel to active duty. There are two bases for ordering members of the reserve components to active duty without their consent and without a declaration of war or national emergency: 10 U.S.C. sections 672(b) and 673(b).

(1) 10 U.S.C. section 672(b) permits the Secretary concerned to order reserve component units and members not assigned to units to active duty for not more than fifteen days. (If the activation is directed at members or units of the National Guard, the consent of the state governor is required.) This authority serves as the basis for ordering US Army Reserve personnel to active duty for annual training (AT) (See Army Regulation (AR) 135-200, Army National Guard and Army Reserve - Active Duty for Training, Annual Training and Full-Time Training Duty of Individual Members, para. 1-6a(8)), and for ordering National Guard personnel to AT outside the United States (AR 135-200, para. 1-6a(9)).

(2) 10 U.S.C. section 673(b) permits the President to authorize the Secretary of Defense to order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve (both units and members not assigned to units) to active duty for not more than ninety days. The exercise of this authority is based upon a presidential determination that it is necessary to augment the active forces for an operational mission. This authority is not to be used for training exercises; rather, it is to be used for actual military missions where augmentation of the active force is required.

b. 10 U.S.C. section 672(d) permits the Secretary concerned to order a member of the reserve components to active duty with member's consent. This provision is the basis on which reserve component soldiers are

ordered to duty for active duty for training (ADT), initial active duty for training, and active duty for special work (formerly special active duty for training). See AR 135-200, para. 1-6a(6).

2. Limitations on Utilization of Reserve Component Units and Personnel Outside the Continental United States by Virtue of Status as Reserve Components.

Aside from the limitation that 10 U.S.C. section 673(b) cannot be used to call reserve component personnel to active duty for training, few other statutory limitations exist on the utilization of reserve component personnel because of their status as reserve component instead of active component. One such limitation is contained in 10 U.S.C. section 671(a), which provides that a "member of the armed forces may not be assigned to active duty on land outside the United States and its territories until the member has completed the basic training requirements of the armed force of which he is a member." Another example is the statutory limitation on the authorized duties of reserve component soldiers on full-time active duty or full-time National Guard duty in the Active Guard/Reserve Program. With some exceptions, their duties are limited to "organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components" (section 412, Public Law (P.L.) 100-180). See also AR 135-18, Army National Guard and Army Reserve - The Active Guard/Reserve Program (15 Jul 85). Other limitations exist in service regulations, but are generally based upon end-strength, fiscal, or other considerations. See generally AR 135-200, para. 1-3.1.

3. Other Restrictions on Utilization of Reserve Component Units and Personnel Outside the Continental United States.

a. Restrictions on the utilization of reserve component personnel outside the continental United States, as a function of their being reserve component personnel, are few in number. Restrictions that will affect reserve component operations in a foreign country derive from other considerations such as the location or nature of the mission, funding considerations, conditions in the country to which they deploy, or statutory or regulatory restrictions applicable to reserve and active component personnel alike. These restrictions are discussed below as part of the discussions of humanitarian and civic assistance, exercise related construction, and security assistance.

b. Restrictions on Reserve Component Participation in Hostile Actions. Soldiers in an ADT status may not be used in a manner inconsistent with their training status or to support active component operational missions, except under circumstances amounting to military exigency. Active Duty for Training status, as outlined above, has as its basis 10 U.S.C. section 672(d), and, is based upon the member's consent to be ordered to active duty. The activities undertaken during ADT must therefore be consistent with the purpose for which the soldier consented to enter active duty -- training. If reserve component personnel or units are to be used for a purpose other than training, then a statutory basis for that deployment must be found and the appropriate authority must order the personnel or units to active duty for that purpose. Of course, should reserve component personnel in an ADT status outside the continental United States be confronted with hostile activities, they would be authorized to react in self-defense, but they may not be used to respond to a military exigency unless there are no US active duty military personnel available to meet the exigency and provided that the reserve component personnel on ADT are used only for the duration of the exigency, until they can be placed in an active duty status under 10 U.S.C. section 673(b), or until active component units or personnel can replace them. In view of these considerations, and the obvious political and policy implications, reserve component units and personnel should not be deployed to or allowed to remain in areas where hostilities are imminent.

4. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).

a. 10 U.S.C. section 401(a)(1) provides:

Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department may carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military operations of the armed forces in a country if the Secretary concerned determines that the activities will promote:

(1) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and

(2) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

b. "Authorized military operations" include exercises in which reserve component units and personnel participate, whether the exercises are directed and coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or are single-service exercises. The Secretary of State must approve any HCA activities carried out pursuant to the authority of 10 U.S.C. section 401.

c. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance activities undertaken in conjunction with military operations must be funded from appropriations specifically provided for that purpose, 10 U.S.C. section 401(c)(1), and cannot be used to provide assistance, directly or indirectly, to individuals, groups, or organizations engaged in military or paramilitary activity, 10 U.S.C. section 401(a)(3).

d. 10 U.S.C. section 401(e) defines HCA activities as:

(1) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;

(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

e. 10 U.S.C. section 401(c)(2) recognizes the authority of the armed forces to incur "minimal" expenditures for HCA activities from other funds, e.g., Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. The Conference Report accompanying this legislation states:

On the low end of the scale, the conferees were concerned that modest activities could generate burdensome paperwork because of the requirements for prior approval, separate financing, and annual reporting. The conferees, therefore, exempted (de minimus) activities from this section. The conferees did not put a specific dollar ceiling on the definition of (de minimus) but wish to make clear they had in mind activities that have been commonplace on foreign exercises for decades. These would include a unit doctor's examination of villagers for a few hours with the administration of several shots and the issuance of some medicines -- but would

not include the dispatch of a medical team for mass inoculations. (De minimus) would also include the opening of an access road through trees and underbrush for several hundred yards -- but would not include the asphalting of any roadway. (Source: H.R. No. 99-1001, 99th Congress, 2d Session, 467-68 (1986) (conference report to accompany S. 2628)).

f. To the extent that a deployment of reserve component units and personnel is designed and properly authorized to engage in HCA activities, and within the limits of authorized funding, reserve component units and personnel, as part of the armed forces outside the continental United States, may carry out HCA activities.

5. Exercise Related Construction (ERC).

a. 10 U.S.C. section 2805 provides authority for the expenditure of funds for unspecified minor military construction. As a result of General Accounting Office audits of US military exercises in Central America, this authority was amended to address the propriety of funding for such construction activities undertaken as part of exercises.

b. 10 U.S.C. section 2805(a)(2) establishes a limit of \$5 million per year per armed service for exercise-related minor military construction. These funds are to be taken from the services' unspecified minor military construction account. All exercise related construction carried out during JCS directed/coordinated exercises is to be funded from this account.

c. 10 U.S.C. section 2805(c)(1) retains the services' authority to fund unspecified minor military construction projects costing less than \$200,000 per project from Operations and Maintenance appropriations. This authority may not be used during JCS directed/coordinated exercises, but may be used during single-service deployments for training (DFT's).

d. Reserve component units and personnel participating in either JCS exercises or single-service DFT's may engage in construction projects, subject only to the availability of proper funds and pursuant to established cost accounting practices. Their reserve component status has no effect on the scope of their activities during such exercises, as the exercises are undertaken for training purposes. The above discussion concerning the threat of hostilities and the proper disposition of reserve component units and personnel applies to these exercises as well, however.

6. Security Assistance.

a. Security assistance is a broad term that describes those statutory programs and authorities under which the US may provide and/or regulate forms of assistance and sales to foreign governments and international organizations for the purpose of enhancing US/mutual security.

b. Security assistance legislation consists mainly of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. The Foreign Assistance Act is comprised of such programs as the Military Assistance Program, International Military Education and Training, Antiterrorism Assistance, Economic Support Fund, and Peacekeeping Operations. The Arms Export Control act serves as the basis for the Foreign Military Sales Program.

c. There are no prohibitions contained in the legislation that are applicable to reserve component personnel solely as a function of their status as members of the Reserve Component. Rather, prohibitions exist as a function of, for example, a prospective recipient country's human rights record, nuclear proliferation policies, or debt situation. Another significant prohibition appears at 22 U.S.C. section 2761(c)(1) (section 21(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act):

Personnel performing defense services sold under this Act may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising that may engage United States personnel in combat activities, outside the United States in connection with the performance of those defense services.

This prohibition applies to all US personnel performing defense services, whether active or reserve component.

d. Reserve component personnel and units may participate in security assistance programs so long as they are properly ordered to active duty and so long as the programs meet all statutory and regulatory requirements.

7. Other Considerations.

a. Use of National Guard Personnel Outside the Continental United States. Pending litigation by a number of state governors has challenged the constitutionality of the so-called Montgomery Amendment, 10 U.S.C. section 672(f), which provides:

The consent of a Governor described in subsection (b) and (d) (of section 672) may not be withheld (in whole or part) with regard to active duty outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions, because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty.

To date, two US appellate courts have addressed the statute's constitutionality. The 1st US Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the statute as constitutional, whereas the 8th US Circuit Court of Appeals initial held it unconstitutional. At the date of this publication, an "en banc" rehearing before the 8th US Circuit Court is underway. If the 8th US Circuit Court upholds its initial finding of unconstitutional, then the final resolution may end up before the US Supreme Court.

b. Exchange Programs. Reserve component personnel are eligible to be called to active duty for the purpose of participating in personnel exchange programs and small unit exchanges. These programs are not designed to provide training to foreign military forces; rather, they allow US personnel and units to be attached to and train with foreign armed forces on a reciprocal basis. Each exchange program must be based on a memorandum of understanding between the US and the foreign country, and each country must bear the costs of its own participation.

8. Conclusion.

a. 10 U.S.C. section 682 provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member of a reserve component who is on active duty other than for training may, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, be detailed or assigned to any duty authorized by law for members of the regular component of the armed force concerned.

b. As this discussion indicates, reserve component units and personnel may participate in a wide variety of activities in furtherance of LIC strategy. The key restrictions on their use lie in regulatory and statutory provisions applicable to both reserve and active component units and personnel. So long as the reserve component units and personnel are properly ordered to active duty for the type of duty contemplated and so long as the duties they are to perform -- construction, HCA, or other -- have a proper statutory basis and are properly funded, they can serve as valuable assets in accomplishing the LIC mission.

9. Caveat. The above discussion is a general overview of some of the more significant statutory and regulatory provisions that apply to deployment of reserve component units and personnel. It should not be used as a legal justification for their use in particular projects or missions. Each deployment must be reviewed on its own merits, taking into account not only the laws outlined above, but political and practical considerations that do not lend themselves to such a general discussion.

As the preceding memorandum indicates, reserve component personnel and units can serve as a valuable asset in accomplishing missions applicable in LIC. A few points are essential to highlight. One key peacetime provision is the fact reserve component personnel and units are normally called to active duty without the member's consent only for training, not to perform operational missions. In some instances with the member's consent, duties other than for training have been performed. One example is the Navy reservists who volunteered to operate on US minesweepers in the Persian Gulf. Otherwise, the only exception permitting the reserve components to perform an operational mission without the member's consent requires a special determination by the President. With the protracted nature of LIC, especially the noncombat nation building portion, day-to-day operations and support to our friends and allies is a critical ingredient to success. Therefore, in LIC, what constitutes an operational mission versus a training mission is a vital distinction. If certain nation building tasks become part of a Commander-in-Chief's (CINC) LIC campaign plan, e.g., humanitarian and civic assistance, rudimentary construction activities by engineers, medical training of physician assistants, etc., then the operational, day-to-day responsibility for these kinds of missions may need to shift to the reserve components, where a vast preponderance of these military skills reside (See Tables 2 through 6, Part IV). True, there are active component forces with nation building skills, but these forces are generally not available for routine, LIC missions. Instead, they are committed full-time to deter war in Europe or South Korea. This issue of day-to-day LIC mission responsibility will be dealt with again under Part V, Future Issues.

The second point to highlight is funding. The reserve components can participate in these nation building exercises, if they are properly funded, usually under JCS- or service-sponsored exercises. As the budget crunch hits,-incidental or primary humanitarian, civic assistance projects will become more difficult to justify. If a CINC must choose between a warfighting training exercise or one with primary humanitarian, civic assistance objectives, warfighting exercises are predictably chosen. But the LIC environment may require different choices. While warfighting skill proficiency must be maintained, noncombat activities that strike at the root causes

of the LIC environment may have a bigger payoff in the long run. In attempting to build a long-range LIC campaign plan, a CINC must carefully weigh the tradeoffs between these different types of military activity. If a warrior's considerable skills and energy can be harnessed to preclude conditions conducive to war, then the real objective -- achieving and maintaining peace under nationally acceptable conditions -- can be obtained without the scourge of war. The issues of expanding the focus of military activities and/or rebalancing funding priorities with regard to LIC will be addressed more extensively in Parts IV and V.

PART III

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

For the most part, much of what is labeled LIC occurs in the lesser developed countries of the Third World. These countries are beset by the natural instability associated with developmental growth. Many of these same countries also lack political and economic opportunities to match their people's rising expectations. A report entitled, World Military and Social Expenditures 1983, paints a graphic picture of the level of human need endemic to the Third World by comparing the poorest one-fifth of the world's population to the richest one-fifth for certain categories of information as shown in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1 - 1983 COMPARATIVE SOCIAL DATA¹⁵

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>RICHEST 1/5</u>	<u>POOREST 1/5</u>
GNP PER CAPITA (\$)	9,469	206
GOV EDUC EXPEND PER CAPITA (\$)	497	6
ADULT LITERACY (%)	97	12
GOV HEALTH EXPEND PER CAPITA (\$)	432	2
LIFE EXPECTANCY (YEARS)	74	53
INFANT DEATHS PER 100 BIRTHS	2	12
POPULATION WITH SAFE WATER (%)	—96	39

The report further states that two billion people live in poverty, having incomes of less than \$500 per year; eleven million babies die annually before their first birthday; and two billion people do not have a dependable supply of safe drinking water.¹⁶ One author notes that in Latin America, many different groups are beginning to awaken the campesinos' consciousness to

their poverty-stricken condition. As the campesinos demand government action to meet their grievances, they frequently encounter indifference by both the government and the country's elite. As a result, they often join a more radical group that promises action.¹⁷ With these kinds of needs rampant throughout the Third World, a revolution in one form or another is inevitable -- all that is needed is a catalyst. The question becomes, "When the catalyst is applied, will it move countries toward freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity, or some other form of authoritarian or totalitarian government?"

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT THREAT

A January 1987 White House paper, National Security Strategy of the United States, outlines the major threats posed by the LIC environment. The LIC environment is ripe for exploitation by interests hostile to the US, which can lead to:¹⁸

- o Interruption of Western access to vital resources.
- o Gradual loss of US military basing and access rights.
- o Expanded threats to sea lines of communication.
- o Gradual shifting of allies and trading partners into positions of accommodation with hostile interests.
- o Expanded opportunities for Soviet political and military gains.

For those immersed in this environment, the costs have been extremely high in terms of governments overthrown, lives lost, and tremendous armament costs. For example, from 1955-1986 there were numerous governments overthrown in the Third World via coups d'etat, revolutionary warfare, etc. When examined by region, the statistics are as follows:¹⁹

- o Central and South America -- 90.
- o Africa -- 109.
- o Southwest Asia -- 63.
- o Southeast Asia and Pacific Basin -- 46.

The costs in terms of lives lost is equally staggering. As a result of both World War I and II, there were approximately sixty million civilian and military fatalities. This figure includes holocaust and other displacement casualties. Since the end of

World War II, there have been at least 122 wars or conflicts fought in which 1000 or more deaths occurred in a given year. The total comes to over nineteen million fatalities. This figure includes combatant deaths as well as war-related casualties, due to famine, disease outbreaks, etc.²⁰

The military armament costs have been equally high. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports over \$8.141 trillion spent between 1975-1985 (1984 constant dollars). It further estimates that spending will exceed \$921 billion for 1986.²¹ These figures reflect expenditures on all categories of weapons, not just those applicable in LIC. Nonetheless, this has led to the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated armaments, which gives the US great cause for concern. Terrorist groups or small nations who gain access to such deadly armaments can greatly destabilize regional military balances, which may force an unwanted superpower confrontation, thereby providing the potential for rapid conflict escalation.

SOVIET THIRD WORLD STRATEGY

In the LIC environment, the Soviets and their proxies have been adept at exploiting the opportunities that abound. Leonid Brezhnev in 1964 stated, "Our goal is to control the two treasure houses upon which the West depends. The energy treasure house of the Middle East and the mineral treasure house of central and south Africa . . ."²² In 1982, Soviet Major General A.N. Lagovskiy stated, "The dependence of the United States on certain strategic minerals from abroad is the weak link in American military capability."²³ The reference to Africa probably includes mineral rich countries such as Angola, Botswana, Gabon, Mozambique, Namibia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the Republic of South Africa. These nations supply major portions of critical minerals worldwide: bauxite (15%), chromium (33%), cobalt (60%), manganese (21%), and the platinum group (40%).²⁴ The current Soviet strategy appears oriented at laying the groundwork for disrupting and/or depriving Western nations of these critical raw materials. Examples of such Soviet activity in the African region include:²⁵

- o Direct military interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zaire.
- o Presence of Cuban soldiers, advisors, or technicians in another seventeen African states.
- o Reported covert or subversive Soviet operations in Namibia, the Republic of South Africa, Zaire's Shaba province, and neighboring areas.

The critical importance of Third World strategic mineral imports becomes sharply focused when you consider how much the US

imports -- over 50%! The figures are even worse for the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan, being 75% and 90% respectively.²⁶ If you measure the "big four" -- manganese, cobalt, chromium, and the platinum group -- US industry is between 91 and 99 percent dependent on mineral imports. As the American Geological Institute stated, "Without manganese, chromium, platinum, and cobalt, there can be no automobiles, no airplanes, no jet engines, no satellites, and no sophisticated weapons -- not even home appliances."²⁷ Conversely, the Soviets import zero percent of these key manufacturing minerals.²⁸

If you look at sea lane choke points, strategic minerals in the Third World, and Soviet aid, some potentially disturbing observations can be made (See Figure 1 below). When you consider the high percentage of strategic mineral imports of the US, the EEC, and Japan, the strategic consequences of any prolonged interruption of these choke points becomes readily apparent. If a war broke out in Europe, approximately 60 percent of the US resupply effort would pass through the Caribbean sea lanes.²⁹ If you examine where most Soviet military assistance has gone in the Third World, you find it went to countries positioned near strategic sea choke points or in areas of strategic mineral value.

SOVIET THIRD WORLD STRATEGY




FIGURE 1³⁰

Some say this apparent Soviet strategy is purely coincidental and not by grand design. However, it really doesn't matter how or why these events have occurred. The facts speak for themselves. The LIC environment is ripe for exploitation and, over time, can have serious and lasting security implications detrimental to US interests and free people everywhere. Former US Senator Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico provides this sobering thought:³¹

Not far in the future awaits sudden recognition of a materials crisis with the possibility of more devastating effects than our current energy crisis. Unfortunately, it apparently will take a major embargo, or the fall of South Africa, or Soviet overt threats to interdict our supply routes to wake us up to this materials crisis.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT STRATEGY

What then is the US national strategy to counteract the LIC threat and the unstable environment in which it occurs? First, not every low intensity conflict has a direct impact on US national security interests. Examples of conflicts not currently impacting US national security interests might be the civil unrest in Sri Lanka or northern India. However, as the January 1988 White House paper, National Security Strategy of the United States, states,³²

When it is in US interest to do so, the United States will:

- o Work to ameliorate the underlying causes of conflict in the Third World by promoting economic development and the growth of democratic political institutions.
- o Support selected resistance movements opposing oppressive regimes working against US interests. Such support will be coordinated with friends and allies.
- o Take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by employing appropriate instruments of US power. Where possible, action will be taken early -- before instability leads to widespread violence; and emphasis will be placed on those measures which strengthen the threatened regime's long-term capability to deal with threats to its freedom and stability.

- o Take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive forces to exploit instability.
- o Assist other countries in the interdiction and eradication of illicit narcotics production and traffic.

The January 1988 White House paper, National Security Strategy of the United States, further states, ". . . the most appropriate application of US military power is usually indirect through security assistance -- training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment."³³

Having reviewed the LIC threat, the costs associated with LIC, and US national LIC strategies, this paper will now examine in greater detail the indirect, noncombat application of the US military power, especially "nation building" activities in the Third World.

PART IV

UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY IN LIC

From a US military perspective with the primary LIC focus being indirect, noncombat application of military power, you find the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) organizations in the lead. Traditionally in warfare, the combat soldiers are first on the ground, followed by the CS/CSS troops. However, in LIC, the reverse is often true -- the CS/CSS units are the first resource. Tables 2 through 6 illustrate the reserve components' percentage of the Total Force in selected noncombat skills, many of which could be used meet US national LIC strategic objectives.

As you can see, a clear majority of the noncombat resources with LIC utility reside in the reserve components. But the US national LIC strategy indicates that military power will be employed indirectly through security assistance, e.g., training, advisory help, etc.

TABLE 2 - COAST GUARD RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS³⁸

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>% of Total Force</u>
Deployable Port Security Units	100
Port Safety & Security Forces	56
Small Boat Operations Shore Facilities	30
Command and Control	23
Repair/Supply/Research	21

TABLE 3 - ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS³⁴

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD & ARMY RESERVE

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>% of Total Force</u>
Construction	
Combat Engineer	67
Water Supply	64
Bridge Company	77
Medical	
Hospitals	77
Medical Units	64
Communications	
Signal Brigades	40
Corps Signal Battalions	63
Separate Signal Companies	56
Civil Affairs	97
Public Affairs	94
Psychological Operations	89
Intelligence	
DIV/CEWI Battalions	33
SIB/ACR-MIC	71
CI Detachments	47
Special Forces Groups	50

TABLE 4 - AIR FORCE RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS³⁵

AIR NATIONAL GUARD & AIR FORCE RESERVE

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>% of Total Force</u>
Theater Airlift	60
Tactical Reconnaissance	54
Tactical Control	55
Tactical Air Support	40
Strategic Airlift Aircrews (AFR Assoc)	50
Air Refueling Aircrews (AFR Assoc)	50
Combat Communications	67
Aerial Port	61
Civil Engineering	44
Aeromedical Evacuation	72

TABLE 5 - NAVAL RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS³⁶

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>% of Total Force</u>
CONUS-based Logistics Airlift Squadrons	100
CONUS-based Fleet Service Squadrons	100
Combat Search & Rescue Squadrons	100
Mobile Inshore Undersea Units	100
Naval Control of Shipping (Personnel)	99
Cargo Handling Battalions	92
Military Sealift Command (Personnel)	85
Ocean Minesweepers	82
Special Boat Forces	66
Mobile Construction Battalions	65
Medical Support (Personnel)	58

TABLE 6 - MARINE CORPS RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS³⁷

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>% of Total Force</u>
Civil Affairs Groups	100
Salvage Platoons	100
Force Reconnaissance Companies	50
Force Service Support Military Police Co	40
Beach and Port Companies	40
Marine Air Control Groups	25
Forward Service Support Groups	50
Observation Aircraft	29
Helicopters	18

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security assistance is listed as the primary implementing tool through which military power will be applied in LIC. Security assistance is a very broad term that has been around a long time under various names and, consequently, has many different connotations to different organizations in and outside of the US Government. The current JCS definition of Security Assistance for the Department of Defense (DOD) is:³⁹

Security Assistance -- (DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

The three military aid programs of security assistance are foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (cash, credit, or concessional sales), military assistance program or MAP (grant aid), and international military education and training or IMET (grant aid).⁴⁰ Foreign Military Sales cases normally involve equipment purchases, advisory help, and associated training required for the purchased equipment's operation and maintenance. Some of the training can also be sponsored under IMET, either in the US or the host nation.

Within the context of these security assistance programs, the reserve components are not routinely funded or authorized to directly train others or give advisory help. As was mentioned earlier in the legal section, reserve component personnel can participate (and be O&M funded) in exchange programs overseas, but only in the context that they receive training with the foreign force. The reserve components can provide services to a host nation, e.g., disaster relief, medical inoculations, etc., but only to the extent that these activities provide training that will promote wartime operational readiness skills. Even in these cases, the funding must come from the "150 series" of appropriations, e.g., foreign assistance vice O&M.

There is one notable exception with regard to reserve component personnel being able to train others with O&M funds -- Special Operations Forces (SOF).⁴¹ Due to the nature of some SOF missions, e.g., training indigenous forces, the only way reserve component SOF personnel can develop these military skills is to actually train host nation personnel overseas. This trainer exception is closely monitored to ensure the quantity of training given is commensurate with what is needed to achieve instructor skill readiness. If the amount of training given is excessive for instructor operational readiness and proficiency, the activity must be credited under security assistance programs and appropriations vice training and O&M. Otherwise, as a general rule on a day-to-day basis, the reserve components are not routinely funded by or considered part of security assistance programs.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Recognizing the legal and funding limitations for employment of reserve component personnel overseas, the reserve components would appear to have little utility in meeting US national LIC strategy objectives, especially if the primary application of military power is indirect through security assistance. However, in a broader context, security assistance is more than just appropriations and their concomitant programs. It includes collective or coalition security, the basis on which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded. To this end, the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict was exploring the feasibility of expanding the current definition of security assistance to read as follows:⁴²

Security assistance is a US national security capability designed to foster and support coalition relationships with selected allied and friendly states and/or groups through the provision of security and defense financing, advice, services, training, and materiel, in order to realize collective security goals.

In LIC, treaties and other accords such as the Rio Pact and Organization of American States Charter provide a legal basis for such a collective security strategy. The CINCs realize that military power alone will not stabilize a region. The CINCs also recognize the adroitness of the Soviets and their surrogates to foment Marxist-Leninist revolution by exploiting the wealth of opportunities inherent in many Third World countries -- poverty, lack of upward social and economic mobility, and the seeming indifference of the government to meet their citizens' basic human needs. The Soviet strategy of staying beneath the trip wire threshold that incites the US public to demand action makes coalition/collective security even more imperative.

Peacetime implementation of US collective security objectives occurs on a regional and country-by-country basis. The regional aspects are orchestrated from the Department of State, while the US ambassador controls implementation at the country level. The military aspects of the strategy are implemented by the theater CINC, after approval by the individual US ambassadors and their country teams. Implementing the peacetime, military aspects of a regional collective security strategy within the context of country-by-country approval is one of the more interesting challenges for the theater CINC.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IMPLEMENTING TOOLS

The US role in helping to train and equip host nation forces to meet their internal and external security needs is well defined under current security assistance programs. Tools such as mobile training teams, military exercises, shows of force, and similar activities are routinely employed by the theater CINCs with ambassadorial approval. As LIC is generally a protracted struggle, developing long-term solutions is important. In many cases, its protracted nature obviates the success of short-term, spectacular operations, where a massive US combat force is inserted. Military intervention merely buys time, but frequently does nothing to ameliorate the root causes of popular dissatisfaction. That is why the US national LIC strategy focuses on indirect, noncombat application of military power.⁴³

INDIRECT LINKAGES

Military efforts to strike at the underlying causes of instability have historically come through humanitarian and civic assistance activities such as disaster relief, health care, road

building, and well drilling. While examining these types of nonlethal, indirect military applications using reserve component personnel and units, keep in mind two basic facts: (1) The reserve component system is primarily built for wartime mobilization and meeting other national emergencies.⁴⁴ (2) While outside the continental United States in peacetime activities short of war or declared national emergency, reserve component personnel can only perform training that enhances their wartime operational readiness skills.⁴⁵ These two facts place the CINC in somewhat of a dilemma, because LIC by definition is below conventional warfare. Therefore, some would argue that reserve component personnel and units have no role in LIC. However, as previously discussed, the reserve components are comprised of personnel possessing many of the skills and equipment a CINC needs to fulfill his portion of a LIC collective security strategy on a day-to-day basis.

How, then, does the CINC employ the reserve components in LIC? Currently, the answer lies primarily through indirect mission activities that will provide reserve component personnel both training and incidental benefit to the host nation. Exercises involving reserve component units and personnel must constantly be screened to ensure training benefits to wartime operational readiness skills are the primary purpose of deployments outside the continental United States. Otherwise, if the host nation is the primary beneficiary, even though the reserve component personnel receive significant training benefit, then the reserve component personnel have just performed security assistance activities illegally!⁴⁶ Training activities funded by O&M accounts cannot be used to provide host nation training that qualifies as security assistance. Unfortunately, the security assistance programs, from which such activities could be sponsored, are woefully underfunded by Congress. Consequently, the CINC may desire to develop a long-term nation building strategy, but lacks the funding support needed to execute this part of his LIC strategy directly. As a result, he is forced to seek alternative, indirect means of accomplishing the strategy. As previously mentioned, training exercises are used which provide incidental, non-military benefit to the host nation. The force mix required to produce these indirect benefits is frequently a patchwork force -- a force not focused, trained, and equipped for building nations, but rather for war and the destruction of nations. If aspects of nation building become part of a military LIC mission, then some minor restructuring of forces and equipment may substantially improve their nation building productivity without sacrificing their warfighting capability.

At this point, many will say that nation building is the responsibility of the US Agency for International Development (AID), Peace Corps, and other US Government civilian plans and programs. Under normal peacetime conditions, they have a valid

argument. But LIC is below conventional war and above, routine peaceful competition among states or groups. As one author stated, "In an atmosphere of decreasing security and increasing civil strife, civilian organizations operating in the countryside may be reluctant or unable to work with the people, and government officials may look to the military to conduct rural development to win the hearts and minds of the people."⁴⁷ In addition, if you analyze the approximately 113 countries that comprise the Third World, some disturbing trends emerge with regard to governments controlled or dominated by the military. In 1960, only 26 percent of Third World countries were under military dominance, e.g., the military executed significant executive and/or judicial-legislative power. By 1987, the number was up to 52 percent.⁴⁸ Despite our strong desire for democratic, civilian controlled governments, we must face the reality of military dominance in over half of the Third World. Logic would indicate that if the US is trying to influence these militarily dominated countries toward democracy and civilian control, then the US military could be one of the primary agencies to bring about such change. Unfortunately, the number of US military officers in friendly Third World countries has declined severely, due primarily to legislative sanctions by Congress. In 1965, the number of US and Soviet bloc military advisors in Third World countries was nearly equal. Today, Soviet bloc military advisors outnumber US military advisors by over a 30 to 1 ratio. If you examine influence through training, the US trains one-third fewer Third World military personnel today as in 1970. Today, the Soviet bloc trains nearly twice as many Third World military personnel as the US does.⁴⁹

"INDIRECT" RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS

Despite indirect linkages and other current limitations, the reserve components continue to make substantial contributions toward fulfilling the theater CINC's regional security objectives. Engineering task forces in the US Southern Command area of responsibility have been used extensively (see Table 7 on the next page). Some typical objectives for such exercises are to (1) enhance readiness of participating US and host nation units, (2) expose engineer units to a bare-based tropical training environment, (3) develop a positive image in the host country toward the US and its military through humanitarian, civic assistance activities, and (4) promote infrastructure development in the host country.⁵⁰

Due to the extensive number of exercises in north central Honduras, reserve component task force personnel have helped Honduran civilian and military health officials start a medical, veterinary, and dental "circuit" to remote villages that would not normally have access to such care. These opportunities provide the reserve components invaluable training in mobilization-like tasks and use of war-related skills, while providing a substantial benefit to our friends and allies.

TABLE 7 - RESERVE COMPONENT ENGINEER EXERCISES IN LATAM⁵¹

<u>Exercise (Country)</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>TF Size (No. Trained)*</u>	<u>Road/Bridge Results</u>
1984 Minuteman I (Panama)	12 wks	350 (2400)	15 KM Upgrade
1985 Blazing Trails (Panama)	20 wks	1150 (13,000)	25 KM New 22 KM Upgrade 13 Bridges
1986 Blazing Trails (Honduras)	24 wks	775 (11,100)	7.5 KM New 3 Bridges
1987 Abriendo Rutas (Ecuador)	28 wks	900 (14,700)	3.5 KM New 10 KM Upgrade 1 Bridge
1987 Blazing Trails (Honduras)	20 wks	770 (9,200)	3 KM New 2 KM Upgrade
1988 Fuertes Caminos (Honduras)	30 wks	950 (16,500)	11.5 KM New 2.5 KM Upgrade

* NOTE: This total includes active and reserve component participation. Totals are estimates only.

Similar types of activities routinely occur throughout the Pacific theater, but with much smaller task forces. Engineer and civic action teams have deployed to the Solomon Islands for disaster relief, repair of damaged navigational beacons on Christmas Island in the Republic of Kiribati, repair of facilities in the Philippines, medical teams to Tonga, etc.⁵²

Military civic action projects in Africa are also under way, designed to assist African military establishments to undertake activities of direct benefit to their civilian populaces. Examples of where the US has worked in partnership with African nations include reconstruction of an airfield in a remote area of Niger; construction of clinics in Malawi, Cote d'Ivoire, and Rwanda; erecting a key bridge in Mauritania; and coastal patrolling in Cameroon, Guinea, and Equatorial Guinea to protect their territorial fishing waters from illegal foreign exploitation.⁵³

Within the Persian Gulf area of operations, US Naval Reserve support has had a significant impact. Five Naval Reserve and one active component ocean minesweepers were deployed to support

tanker escort operations. Twenty-two reservists volunteered for recall to active duty to serve on the minesweepers for the duration of the operation.⁵⁴

The Coast Guard Reserve has also contributed to US national LIC strategy by their support to National Drug Interdiction Task Forces in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean.⁵⁵ Other Coast Guard Reserve contributions have been made through their deployable port security units as well as the African coastal patrolling activities previously mentioned.

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

The importance of such types of activities was recognized by senior DOD leaders. In Defense Guidance for FY90-94, a key mid-term objective for LIC was outlined:⁵⁶

[283] (U) Support LIC operational requirements by improving predeployment training of active component and reserve component medical, engineer, and civil affairs elements . . . to support the regional CINCs in a LIC environment.

This mid-term objective stresses improving predeployment training. As previously discussed, the reserve components have many unique training challenges in attaining their operational wartime readiness. However, their overseas deployment training activities in LIC present even greater challenges. Based on the author's observations of engineering task forces in the US Southern Command area, it's important to highlight just a few of these challenges: productivity versus training, lack of CAPSTONE trace, and continuity of operations without permanent in-country US garrison installations.

PRODUCTIVITY VERSUS TRAINING

Many of the reserve components' training activities applicable to LIC strategy are a form of "nation building." As a result, many host nation people are primarily interested in seeing kilometers of road built, people treated for disease, and public facilities improved. Due to the "training" nature of the exercises and projects, they often do not understand why more cannot be done with all of the American soldiers present. One must remember that most reserve component soldiers are doing this as part of their "annual training." This special once-a-year activity is frequently the only time the individual soldier gets extensive hands-on training with their specialty-related equipment. During annual training, many soldiers work to attain "fully qualified" status in their military specialty. Consequently, there is some degradation in productivity. Experience has shown, however, that, after a few days of training, the level of productivity becomes first rate. The US

Ambassador and his country team, during the negotiations with the host nation to obtain approval for the training exercise, need to ensure the host nation has realistic productivity expectations.⁵⁷

LACK OF CAPSTONE TRACE

The CAPSTONE program has already been touched on. Due to the limited training time available, most reserve component units struggle to fulfill their mission essential task list for their current war plan tasking(s). Normally, units designed for the NATO scenario would participate in an overseas deployment training exercise for that theater every three to five years. When a unit gets tapped for an exercise in a theater for which they are not CAPSTONE-aligned, their training focus usually changes significantly. Suddenly they need to acquire the "lessons learned" from areas they have completely ignored before. Until recently, European tasked units only had cold weather clothing. If tapped for a tropical deployment, hot weather clothing was difficult to obtain. If their equipment was not adaptable to the tropical mission, then obtaining the proper equipment (and the requisite training time on it) compounded their list of problems. Again, keep in mind you only have 38 or 39 training days available per year. That is why the Army regulations list a three to five year planning cycle requirement to enable reserve component units sufficient time to prepare for an overseas deployment training exercise -- to their primary theater.⁵⁸ Therefore, when deploying to an unfamiliar theater, planning time is even more critical to accommodate adjustments. Unfortunately, the lead time is often a calendar year or less. Thirty-nine days is not a lot of time to make substantial adjustments. A bumper sticker said, "Lack of planning on your part does not constitute GROUNDS for PANIC on my part." To the reserve components' credit, they have stepped up to and overcome this frequently unreasonable challenge.

CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

As most reserve component overseas deployment training activities are performed in an annual training status, the task force commander sees a completely new set of trainees about every two weeks. Can you imagine a professional football team that has a complete set of "new" players every two weeks? Talk about a coaching challenge! Again, to the reserve components' credit, they do just that and do it well. As previously cited, the exercise on the eastern slopes of the Andes Mountains in the jungles of Ecuador had a task force size of 900 people for 28 weeks. Of the 900, approximately 150 were "duration personnel," there for the full 28 weeks. The remaining 750 personnel came in 14 different rotations, i.e., 750 "new" trainees every two weeks.⁵⁹ That kind of changeover puts a tremendous burden on predeployment planning and training. When a unit deploys to a mature theater like Europe or South Korea, there are plenty of

in-country active component units and garrisons. If you have a few planning omissions, you have plenty of people and supplies readily available to "cover your six." In many LIC areas such as the jungles of Ecuador, you are in a very austere environment without in-country US bases or supply depots. Minor planning omissions can be "show stoppers." In addition, many of these LIC-related overseas deployment training activities have highlighted the problems of maintainability of many pieces of engineer equipment. In fact, some reserve component equipment used in a 1986 engineer exercise in the US Southern Command area is still nonoperational two years later.⁶⁰

PART V

FUTURE ISSUES

The challenges facing the reserve components in LIC are many. The number of training days available annually will, in all likelihood, remain fixed. Reserve component members are citizen-soldiers with regular civilian jobs. To demand more concessions of employers for reserve component members in peacetime may not be feasible. Recruiting needs will continue to dictate the pattern of unit dispersion. These kind of factors are unlikely to change.⁶¹ However, there are several issues that need to be addressed by national leaders, not just the military leadership of the reserve components.

- o What should active and reserve component LIC missions be, especially with regard to nation building in the Third World?

Efforts to analyze and define the full gamut of DOD LIC missions are currently under way by a number of different agencies to include the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, US Southern Command, US Special Operations Command, the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, and the Army's Combined Arms Center. These efforts are concurrent with doctrinal development, from which the mission statements are derived. These efforts, however, do not address reserve component roles in LIC with any degree of depth. This may be a major oversight.

In the author's opinion, there is one primary mission area that requires immediate review, if the US is to successfully meet the evolving LIC threat -- DOD involvement in nation building. Currently, nation building is the responsibility of the Department of State (DOS), implemented through AID, in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture, Peace Corps, and other similar non-DOD US Government organizations. Under normal peacetime conditions, many of these humanitarian, civic assistance/nation building functions rightly belong with DOS/AID, the Peace Corps, etc. However, LIC is that gray area below

conventional warfare and above routine, peaceful competition among states or groups. For Third World countries enmeshed in the instability of the LIC environment, their military is often the source of national leadership and power. It would seem a logical extension to have the host nation military judiciously contribute to the civilian populaces' needs by performing humanitarian, civic assistance projects, especially when their security is not jeopardized. As one author stated,⁶²

The long-range goal of military civic action is nation building. In underdeveloped countries, the military establishment has a great capability to nurture national development and, in many cases, has a relative monopoly over leadership, technical skills, administrative experience, mobility, and a willingness . . . to spend time away from urban centers.

Such military civic action/nation building efforts make efficient use of manpower resources, can bolster support for the government, develop skills for use in the civilian sector once enlistments expire, and enhance a positive military image vice one of corruption and power abuse. Congress has recognized the humanitarian, civic assistance area as a special area for DOD involvement and has set up special accounts for such activities.⁶³ It is the author's opinion that such activities should be expanded in Third World countries, and, in many cases, can best be implemented in a military-to-military context.

With over half of Third World countries controlled or strongly influenced by their military establishments, an increased US military "presence" is vital.⁶⁴ Otherwise, our ability to influence their military establishments toward democratic, civilian-led political institutions can become severely limited. Military-to-military contacts, while engaged in nation building activities, have many benefits: (1) We receive training not routinely available in the US, which can substantially increase our wartime readiness skills; (2) The host nation receives new or improved roads and bridges, better health care capabilities, clean water sources, sanitation facilities, etc.; (3) The reserve component personnel, upon returning home, can spread "first hand" information to their local communities about what is really happening in these Third World countries; and (4) US military "presence" provides an opportunity to influence others to seek the freedom and ideals upon which the US was founded. For example, during a joint US-Ecuadorian military engineering exercise near the town of Archidona, Ecuador, the town's quasi-official spokesman made these remarks,⁶⁵

About 95 percent of the people are happy to have the North Americans here. The other 5 percent are communists. The soldiers have been working hard, not exploiting us, not getting drunk like the communists

said they would do, just working hard. It will be disappointing to see the soldiers leave because the road may never be completed without them, and our dream of uniting the towns of the Napo Province may never be realized. We don't ask for much -- just one road.

One approach that may work well in Third World countries calls on a time-honored concept -- citizen-soldiers. In biblical times, when the Hebrews were rebuilding Jerusalem, Nehemiah had the people working and carrying their weapons at the same time. They were too poor and weak as a nation to have a standing army protect them. If they did, then the city would not get rebuilt.⁶⁶ Perhaps in the Third World, beset by poverty and huge foreign debt, it is time to revitalize this lesson from the past. The US should consider merging the citizen-soldier concept of the early American Minutemen into its aid programs. In essence, you wind up with US Government groups like the Peace Corps that also teach rudimentary self-defense skills, i.e., the host nation's civilian populace develops rudimentary food, health, water, transportation, sanitation, and self-defense capabilities. By developing an adequate self-defense force, the number of standing military personnel needed to counter external threats could be significantly reduced, while at the same time meeting many rudimentary needs of the country. In the African region, there is a growing awareness of what military civic action can do. At a 1988 African military trade show, the International Exhibition for Security and the Army held in Libreville, Gabon, the conference theme was, "Applications of the Peace Time Army for Civic Action."⁶⁷ While not a commitment by African leaders to military civic action, the conference theme indicates their willingness to explore alternatives.

Prevention of conflict is one of the primary reasons the US maintains its standing armed forces. By helping lesser developed nations to form economically viable and free societies, we may be able to prevent future conflicts with serious US national security implications. If US national leaders decide to boost stabilizing efforts in the LIC arena by increased use of the reserve components in developmental assistance, there are several additional questions to be answered.

- Will DOD developmental assistance activities be a primary, secondary, or ad hoc mission responsibility?

Currently, DOD developmental assistance is primarily an ad hoc mission. To elevate developmental assistance to a primary or secondary mission will require substantial cost/benefit/risk analysis. With constrained and/or declining military spending, if you want to increase a capability in one area, you must normally decrease a capability in another. For some, the world political environment seems quite promising. Peace seems to breaking out in many regions of the world. United Nations

peacekeeping operations are currently in eight locations with the possibility of an additional four in the foreseeable future. The signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty between the US and the Soviet Union has provided the first wholesale elimination of certain classes of nuclear warhead delivery vehicles. Consequently, many now feel the real probability of a major conventional or nuclear conflict between the superpowers is becoming less likely. Therefore, future conflicts are most likely to occur in the LIC arena.

If the preceding analysis is valid and a cornerstone of US LIC strategy remains indirect, noncombat application of military power through security assistance, then some realigning of military missions may be necessary. This would permit the application of more resources where conflicts detrimental to US security interests are most likely to occur. Enhanced military-to-military nation building activities may be an ideal leverage point to further US interests in the LIC environment. If US leaders decide to elevate nation building by the military beyond its current ad hoc status, then an analysis must be performed to determine how much redirection can be done without significantly detracting from US conventional and nuclear deterrence capability. For instance, there may be significant impacts on training, equipment requirements, and organizational structure. United States operations in the Persian Gulf raised key questions about readiness and training of active and reserve naval units. Traditionally for the reserves, the concept of training was rigidly centered around wartime mobilization. However, Persian Gulf operations highlighted the increased probability of Naval Reserve units serving worldwide in support of peacetime contingencies.⁶⁸ General Crist, then Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, further amplified the difficulties LIC presents during congressional testimony,⁶⁹

What we are faced with in the northern part of the [Persian] Gulf is low intensity conflict at sea. We did not build our boats or ships to fight that kind of war. Even the boats that we built for Vietnam are riverboats, designed for duty in rivers, not open seas People are beginning to realize that we need to look more closely at this lower end of the conflict spectrum, that low intensity conflict is not necessarily just in Latin America.

Items such as the mission essential task list will need to be rebalanced so active and/or reserve component units can maintain their deterrence and warfighting capability at the high end of the conflict spectrum, while achieving a significantly greater developmental assistance capability in the LIC arena.

- o Should DOD developmental assistance activities belong primarily to the active or reserve components?

Historically, the most suitable missions for the reserve components were envisioned as those with low peacetime activity levels and high wartime surge requirements. Accordingly, if a mission had to be performed on a daily basis or required daily training, then that mission was best suited to the active component.⁷⁰ With a shrinking active force and so much "nation building" capability already in the reserve components, can the active side handle the day-to-day requirements a protracted LIC campaign plan seems to demand? Strategists and force planners must decide where these Total Force assets will come from. Historic precedent would indicate that more of the active force should be devoted to meeting the day-to-day LIC challenge. But that may not be the wisest course of action as most of the active force is needed to provide the immediate deterrence capability in the conventional and nuclear warfare arena. True, some day-to-day missions, designed to deter war in the mid to high intensity arena, are being performed by reserve component units. In addition, for certain contingencies, reserve component units are scheduled to arrive in theater before some of their active counterparts. However, LIC does not pose an immediate threat to US security and survival, but rather an insidious, long-term one. Therefore, transferring a significant portion of the LIC "nation building" responsibilities to the reserve components may be one of the best alternatives. In the author's opinion, selected reserve component units should be designated as primary peacetime LIC nation building forces with a secondary mission to support major wartime contingency plans. This designation would substantially alter training, equipment requirements, and the evaluation "report card" for these selected units.

At this point, some may view this proposed shift as giving the reserve components exclusive responsibility for LIC "nation building," which is not the intent of this paper. Due to the reserve component training system limitations previously outlined and the interdependent support structure developed under the Total Force policy, giving exclusive responsibility to the reserve components for this important area would not be prudent. Experience in the US Southern Command indicates that a judicious blend of active and reserve component task force "duration" personnel is needed to ensure the DOD system provides sufficient support in logistics and other key areas.⁷¹ Also, when a host nation must share the cost of these exercises, they should expect a reasonable ratio of productivity-to-cost for their investment. Consequently, a Total Force task force, predominately manned and led by the reserve components, can best serve the interests of all parties concerned in the LIC nation building arena.

- o Where will the additional funding for such expanded activities come from?

In the funding area, additional appropriations would be needed in either the security assistance program "150" accounts or DOD appropriations under 10 U.S.C. section 401 (Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, see previous discussion under part II). With various Program Decision Budget memoranda already indicating the cancellation or postponement of major new systems like the V-22 Osprey, one would expect the military service chiefs to be very reluctant to give up more resources to combat the insidious threat of LIC.⁷² However, the President's bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy indicated that a total US LIC strategy could be funded for an annual cost of approximately \$12 billion without significantly impairing the US ability to prosecute higher intensity wars.⁷³ In a report by the Regional Conflict Working Group (RCWG) to the Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy, the RCGW recommended basic reforms in the security assistance arena. The first of twelve such recommendations centered on the vital necessity of obtaining multi-year security assistance appropriations from Congress. The RCGW indicated that consistent funding over time was more important than any given amount in a specific year.⁷⁴ When faced with year-to-year budget uncertainties, effective long-term planning by individual country teams is very difficult. Of the \$12 billion annual outlay, the RCGW further concluded that only a portion of this money would require new appropriations.⁷⁵

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The choices the national leadership must make with regard to LIC strategy and resources will be difficult. An integrated, long-term approach designed to help our friends and allies develop economically viable, democratic societies is a prudent investment in America's future. The US cannot afford to wait until the patient has contracted an irreversible, fatal disease before we decide to help. The US can successfully implement a strategy to prevent LICs by having (1) an expanded security assistance focus, (2) more US military advisor "presence," (3) more direct involvement by the theater CINCs in nation building, and (4) multi-year, prudently funded programs. The reserve components, with their immense capability to directly and positively impact our lesser developed friends and allies, should be an essential part of US LIC strategy. Change in the Third World is inevitable, either evolutionary or revolutionary, all that is lacking is a catalyst. The US and its reserve component units and personnel can provide a catalyst that moves nations toward freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity.

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